In this paper we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that "strong" players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate the online correlation of the actions of "weak" players, where this correlation is concealed from an opponent of "intermediate" strength.
Introduction
Consider a group of agents interacting with each other sequentially, where the overall strategies employed by these agents are independent. Some level of correlation between their actions may still evolve; i.e., if we look at the actions that they take at some point in time, these actions may be correlated.
1
On the other hand, as every mixed strategy (in a game with perfect recall) is equivalent to a behavioral one [15] , conditional on the full history up to that point in time, these actions are independent.
2 Therefore, the correlation of actions is not concealed from a fully rational observer: this observer has the resources to make a statistical prediction of the coming tuple of actions, so that conditional on his prediction, the actions are independent. This fact plays an important, albeit implicit, role in various folk theorems of repeated games.
The current paper is concerned with repeated games in which players are not fully rational. We consider the impact on equilibrium when the players' ability to gather and process information and make computations is not unlimited. The literature contains various models of such bounded complexity 1 For example, if player 1 chooses with probability 1/2 to play repeatedly the action α, and with probability 1/2 to play repeatedly the action β, and player 2 imitates at each stage the previous action of player 1, then at any stage t ≥ 2, the probability distribution over the action pair (a 1 t , a 2 t ) is correlated: the probability of (α, α) is 1 2 , and so is the probability of (β, β).
2 E.g., in the previous example, at any stage t ≥ 2, conditional on the history (a 1 , . . . , a t−1 ), the distribution of the action pair (a 1 t , a 2 t ) is uncorrelated: either the history tells you (from stage 2 on) that the forthcoming pair is (α, α) with probability 1, or it tells you that it is (β, β) with probability 1. in repeated games. One prominent model is that of finite automata (see, e.g., [4, 18] ), where each player has some finite capacity for memory storage.
Another prominent model is bounded recall (see, e.g., [2, 16] ), where each player has a finite number of the last previous stages that he is able to recall.
There are, of course, variations to these models (e.g., [24] ), as well as other interesting models (e.g., [8] ). The paper is focused on the bounded recall model, for which the main results of the paper are discussed, stated, and proved, in detail. The analogous results for the variations of the bounded recall model, as well as for the finite automata model, are stated and derived in the last section of the paper.
For the case of more than two players, little is known about the equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with boundedly rational players. The main difficulty in the characterization of equilibrium payoffs of infinitely repeated games lies in the identification and quantification of feasible punishments, which depend on the possibilities of concealed correlation that a group of players may have.
The possibility of concealing correlation certainly depends upon the capabilities of the players. It seems reasonable, and is demonstrated in various models, that "stronger" players (i.e., players with higher capabilities) can out-strategize "weaker" opponents, and the concealment of correlation may be one manifestation of this. In this paper we focus on the surprising, indeed counter intuitive, possibility of concealing correlation of players' actions from a stronger opposition.
A group of players, called the concealing group, can conceal a distribution D over tuples of its members' actions from other players (or observers), if they have a profile of (independent) strategies such that (1) for every strategy profile of the other players, the empirical distribution of the sequence of their actions is close to D, and (2) this sequence appears, in the eyes of the other players, to be close to an i.i.d. play with that distribution D.
We can distinguish two instances of the problem of concealing a correlated distribution of action profiles. The distinction is based on the relations between the recall capacities of the concealing group and that of the other players. For clarity's sake we assume 3 that there is only one other player, called the opponent. The first instance is where the concealing group consists of relatively weak players and the opponent is stronger. 4 The present paper focuses on the second instance, where the concealing group of players contains both weak and strong players relative to the opponent.
Suppose (for example) that the concealing group contains two players, whose recall is shorter than that of the opponent, and an additional player, and the group tries to conceal from the opponent a distribution of action profiles in which the actions of the two weak players are correlated. Then why should this additional player matter at all? After all, in our model there is no pre-game communication, and all communication opportunities are embedded within the actions available to the players, and these actions are public. Therefore, it seems a priori, that the opponent, whose recall is longer than that of the weak players, can untangle whatever use the two weak players can make of the actions of the strong player.
The main message of this paper is that a concealing group that includes a player whose recall is longer than that of the opponent (or observer) can conceal from the opponent a distribution of the group's action profiles in which the actions of the "weak" players -those whose recall is shorter than that of the opponent -are correlated (Theorems 2.1 and 2.2). Theorem 2.1, which is a special case of the more general Theorem 2.2, applies to a four-player game: the concealing group consists of two players of relatively short recall, called the weak players, and a player with a long recall, called the strong player, and the opponent has intermediate recall. The theorem illustrates the possibility that the concealing group can conceal from the opponent a distribution (over tuples of its members' actions) in which the actions of the two weak players are correlated. Moreover, it specifies simply stated conditions on the stage game and the recall capacities of the players that enable the concealing group to conceal from the opponent any correlated distribution of the two weak players' actions.
The more general result, Theorem 2.2, applies to repeated games with an arbitrary number of players: the opponent has intermediate-length recall, and the concealing group, which consists of the set of all other players, is composed of two groups: weak players with relatively short recall and strong players with long recall. The theorem specifies simply stated conditions on their recall capacities and an information-theoretic condition on a (possibly correlated) distribution of joint actions of the concealing group, so that the concealing group can conceal this distribution from the opponent.
In both theorems it is assumed that the recall of the opponent is subexponential in the recall of the weak players. A natural question that arises is whether this "subexponential" condition is essential for the conclusions of the theorems. Theorem 2.3 states that when the recall of the opponent is longer than some exponential function of the recall of the weak players, then the concealing group cannot conceal more than a negligible amount of correlation of the weak players' actions. Moreover, this conclusion holds even if the concealing group can correlate their strategies before the start of the game, and even if their strategies are allowed to choose a randomized action as a function of the recalled past, and the strong players are fully rational.
The reader may by now be wondering why allies need to correlate their actions "online," i.e., in the common course of play, by the public sequence of actions taken. Can they not do it "offline" by communicating through private channels? The fact of the matter is that sometimes they cannot.
Some examples are anti-cartel regulations, or various types of multistage auctions, where "the rules of the game" forbid collusion.
Online concealed correlation affects the individually rational payoff (i.r.p.)
in the repeated game. In fact, the concealment of correlation in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is stated in terms of the i.r.p. Section 8.1 defines a notion of concealment that depends upon the strategies at the players' disposal (and involves no payoffs). This notion enables us to reformulate the conclusion of the main result in a form that emphasizes the fact that the result concerns the concealment of a distribution, independently of the payoffs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the main results. In Section 3 we prove Theorem 2.3. In Section 4
we prove an instance of Theorem 2.1, for the three-player matching pennies game. This instance provides a relatively simple counter-example to [17, Theorem 1] (see also comment 1 in Section 8.5), and serves as a helpful introduction to some of the ideas in the general results.
In Section 5 we prove Theorem 2.1 by showing how the proof for the three-player matching pennies game can be extended to other four-player games. The proof of Theorem 2.1 presents some of the ideas that appear in greater generality in the proof of Theorem 2.2. In addition, there are a few differences between the two proofs. Therefore each of these proofs may be a step towards different future extensions and related results. In Section 6 we prove Theorem 2.2. In Section 7 we discuss the implications of our results for equilibrium payoffs. 
The Model and the Main Result
Our discussion and results are stated for undiscounted infinitely repeated games. However, it will be clear from the tools we use that the discussion and results apply to sufficiently long finitely repeated games, as well as to infinite discounted games with a large enough discount factor (see comment 2 in Section 8.5).
Infinitely repeated games
Let G = (N, A, r) be an n-player game in strategic form. N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |} is the finite set of players, A = × i∈N A i where A i is the set of actions of player i, and r = (r i ) i∈N where r i : A → R is the payoff function of i. The linear extension of r i to the functions defined on ∆(A), where ∆( * ) stands for the probability distributions over the set * , is also denoted by r i , and for a distribution y on a set B and a distribution x on a set C we denote by (y, x) the product distribution y ⊗ x on B × C.
Player i's individually rational payoff (i.r.p.) in the mixed extension of
The game G ∞ denotes the infinite repetition of G with perfect monitoring.
At each stage t = 1, 2, . . ., the players play the game G (the stage game); i.e., at stage t, player i chooses an action a i t ∈ A i . A play of G ∞ is an infinite sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . ., where a t = (a i t ) i∈N ∈ A . In our context, the payoff for i in G ∞ is the "limit" of his average payoff along the play, 5 namely, " lim " T →∞ 1 T T t=1 r i (a t ). However, we qualify "limit,"
since a sequence of payoffs (r i (a t )) t≥1 induced by some play (a t ) t≥1 need not have a limit of means (Cesaro limit). Nevertheless, such a limit does exist for any play that is defined by stationary bounded recall strategies, or finite automata strategies.
The set of all histories that may be played at the first t − 1 stages is A t−1 (where A 0 stands for {∅}), and A * = ∪ ∞ t=1 A t−1 is the set of all possible histories, of any length. A pure strategy of i in the repeated game with perfect monitoring G ∞ is a function σ i : A * → A i . For any history h = (a 1 , . . . , a t−1 ) ∈ A t−1 , σ i (h) is the action that player i will take at stage t, if the history at that stage is h. A profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N of pure strategies in
Bounded recall strategies
A stationary bounded recall (bounded recall for short, or SBR) strategy for player i in G ∞ assumes that i's play at any given stage relies only on the last 5 The payoff in infinitely repeated games is sometimes taken to be the discounted average of payoffs, namely, λ
, for some 0 < λ < 1. In this case the payoff is called discounted.
A (pure) m-recall strategy for i is a pure strategy σ i such that σ i (a 1 , . . . , a t−1 ) = σ i (a t−m , . . . , a t−1 ) for t > m.
Denote by BR i (m) the set of all m-recall strategies of player i in G ∞ .
Note that any m-recall strategy is, in particular, a k-recall strategy for any
For a tuple − → m = (m i ) i∈N , the game G( − → m) is defined as the infinite repetition of G, but where the strategies of player i are his m i -recall strategies.
I.e.,
wherer is defined for a tuple φ = (
, where (a t (φ)) t≥1 is the play defined by the strategy profile φ.
Here we can write lim without reservations, since any play resulting from SBR strategies will be periodic. Let M be an integer s.t. ∀i m i ≤ M . Since there are at most |A| M possible memories of length M , in any play one of them is bound eventually to appear twice, say at stages t 1 , t 2 . Then, by induction on t ≥ 1, every player takes at t 2 + t the same action he took at t 1 + t, and therefore the play enters a cycle. The limiting average payoff will then simply be the average payoff over the cycle.
In the sequel, we examine player i's i.r.p. in the mixed extension of G( − → m),
wherer is now extended to mixed strategies; that is, it is the expectation of our previousr.
Let v i ( − → m) denote the maxmin level, namely, Notation: for two functions g, f : N → R + we write g f or g(n)
The main result
In the main results, the set of players N is fixed, and the recall capacities
For a gradual presentation of the main result, we start with a special case of the result and a restriction of the number of players to four. The general result will be stated thereafter.
Theorem 2.1. Let G = (N, A, r) be a four-player game, and let m i : N → N,
where z is the uniform distribution over A 4 , and
In particular, if, in addition, the payoff function r 3 is independent of the actions of player 4, then lim sup
and if, in addition, log m 4 m 3 , then
Inequality (2.1) asserts that for every distribution y over action pairs of players 1 and 2, lim sup n→∞v 3 ( − → m) is less than or equal to max x r 3 (y, x, z),
where z is the uniform distribution over the actions of player 4.
The next theorem generalizes inequality (2.1) in two important directions.
First, z need not be the uniform distribution, and y need not be independent of z. We provide a condition on the distribution D −3 of the actions of players 1, 2, and 4, such that for any distribution D −3 that satisfies the condition,
. In addition, the number of players need not be 4; we allow for an arbitrary number of players (and more than one of them may be strong).
The condition on the distribution D −3 , or on D −k in the case of an arbitrary number |N | ≥ k of players, is stated by using the following informationtheoretic notion (see, e.g., [7] ).
For a finite set A, and an A-valued random variable x, denote P a = Pr{x = a}. The entropy of x is defined 6 as H(x) = − a∈A P a log(P a ).
Note that if x is uniformly distributed, then H(x) = log |A|, and that if x, y are independent then H(x, y) = H(x) + H(y).
The assumptions on the recall capacities m i , i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |}, which depend on a parameter n ∈ N, are:
The inequality m i+1 (n) ≥ m i (n) in assumption (A1) orders the players in N according to their recall capacity. The assumptions (A2) and (A3) single out one player k ∈ N , and partition the other players into two groups:
that each player i ∈ J + has a much longer recall than that of player k, and assumption (A3) asserts that the length of player k's recall is subexponential in that of each one of the players j ∈ J.
For k ∈ N we denote by −k the subset {j ∈ N : j = k} of players, and for a nonempty subset S ⊂ N we denote by D S a distribution on A S := × j∈S A j .
6 Henceforth log = log 2 .
For every j ∈ S, respectively a nonempty subset S * ⊂ S, the marginal
Theorem 2.2. Let (N, A, r) be a game with N ⊃ {1, 2, . . . k}, and assume that the recall capacities m i (n) (i ∈ N ) satisfy (A1), (A2), and (A3). Let
Note that Theorem 2.2 generalizes Theorem 2.
There are other special cases of Theorem 2.2 that are of independent interest. One such special case is when there is only one "strong player," i.e., when |N | = k + 1. k, the distribution that is defined by σ = (σ −k , τ k ) on plays of the repeated game, is such that for almost all t, the conditional distribution of a
holds for any payoff function r : A → R.
Tightness of the subexponential condition
The above results demonstrate the feasibility of concealing correlation against a subexponential opponent. The following theorem shows that this subexponential condition is tight, in the following sense: there exists an exponential relation s.t. a group of players cannot conceal more than a negligible amount of correlation against an opponent, whose strength stands in that relation to their strength, even if other players help them. 7 Moreover, this is the case even if the players use behavioral bounded recall strategies (note that a mixture of m-recall behavioral strategies need not be equivalent to an m-recall behavioral strategy).
The theorem states that for every ε > 0 there are universal prediction
, such that for any subset J of players and a correlated strategy σ with σ J being a mixture of (1 − ε)
log k log |A| -recall behavioral strategies, the empirical distance between the conditional σ-distribution of a J t given (a 1 , . . . , a t−1 ) and the product distribution ⊗ j∈J µ j (a t−k , . . . , a t−1 ) is close to 0.
The theorem may be viewed as an asymptotic version of one aspect of Kuhn's theorem [15] , namely, that conditioning on the full history results in a product distribution. But, in addition, here the prediction strategy is time-independent and universal (i.e., it is independent of the strategies of the players), and the theorem holds even if players are allowed to correlate their randomized strategies.
The allowance for behavioral strategies only serves to strengthen the result. The proof is simpler if one considers only randomization over pure strategies.
Let Σ
i denote the set of all (not necessarily bounded recall) behavioral strategies of player i in the repeated game. For a subset J ⊂ N of players and a profile a ∈ A of actions, Σ J is the cartesian product
, and a J is the list (a j ) j∈J of the J coordinates of a.
7 In fact, the conclusion holds even when this strong "opponent" does not actually participate in the game, but merely observes it.
Each strategy profile s ∈ BR
is a random variable defined over the space of plays of the repeated game (and with values in the distributions over A J ).
, defines the probability distri- 
we have
where
) and denotes the
Note that the theorem asserts that (2.5) holds for any correlated strategy
The implication of the theorem for the special case
Therefore, it suffices to prove that (2.5) holds for any
In what follows we will use the following application of Hoeffding's in-
Hoeffding's inequality [13, Theorem 2] implies that for every fixed positive integer d and δ > 0,
Therefore, for every positive real number > 0,
2 ) for δ > 0 sufficiently small, e.g., for δ ≤ 1/2.
Therefore, if d is an integer-valued random variable (which can be corre-
valued random variable that is defined on the space of plays by a t [m] = (a t−m , . . . , a t−1 ). For t > k and f ∈ A m , let L(t, f ) and t be the random variables defined on the space of plays by
e., l t counts the number of past appearances of the current m-length recall a t [m] in its k-recalled stages).
For every integer T ≥ 2k and
We define
is defined as the fraction of times that the action b j of player j followed an appearance of a k+1 [m] in a, i.e.,
, and a
Using (3.2), we have
.
An Example of Online Concealed Correlation by "Weak" Players
Here we present an example of online concealed correlation by weak players, with the help of a stronger one, in a specific four-player game. The construction and proof of this instance contains a few of the ideas required for the general result, and we hope that it serves as a helpful introduction to the proof of the general result.
The game and the strategies
Consider the normal-form game in Figure 1 , which equals Matt's minmax in correlated actions, i.e., min y∈∆(
. The key point is that Forest's sequence of actions assists Rowena and Colin in correlating their own actions, while these "signals" remain unintelligible to
Matt.
Since we are interested in the asymptotic behavior, let the recall capacities be functions of a parameter n: player i has a recall of length m i (n),
, and the functions m i are assumed to retain some relations among themselves, to be specified shortly. Rowena's, Colin's, and Forest's mixed strategies will assure that Matt's maximum expected payoff approaches − , as n goes to infinity.
Following is a general description of the scheme. Colin's play will approximate a long cycle of random i.i.d. actions, distributed
. Forest, who has a relatively large memory, will be able to remember the whole cycle. Forest's actions will be used by Rowena as instructions on how she should play, so that her actions will coincide with Colin's. However, if these instructions were simply the forthcoming actions of Colin, or any deterministic function of them, the correlation would not be concealed 
Actually, instead of (4.2), we can settle for the following two weaker requirements:
which are both implied by (4.2).
The available actions for Rowena, Colin, and Matt are A 1 = A 2 = A 3 = {0, 1} (instead of {T, B}, {L, R}, and {E, W }). For simplicity, let Forest's actions be A 4 = {0, 1, x}.
K will be the size of a block (as we consider the asymptotic behavior, we may assume w.l.o.g. that K is an integer). We can choose an integer-valued
, and
namely, L obeys the same magnitude restrictions, compared to m 1 , m 2 , as m 3 does, but L's magnitude is larger than m 3 (and L is at least somewhat smaller than m 4 ). L will be the length of a cycle.
Let Colin choose at random an L-periodic sequence
where the distribution of
, given that
Colin's strategy, σ 2 , is to play the chosen sequence (an alternative description
with uniform probability over all such sequences; then play this sequence). Thus, if Forest's block was (y 1 , . . . , y K ), then the block Rowena plays is f (y 1 , . . . , y K ). Equality (4.3) guarantees that, for every f , this will be an m 1 -recall strategy (Rowena's strategy, σ 1 , is mixed, according to the random choice of f ). 9 The equivalence of these two descriptions relies on the uniformity of the distribution Forest enters a cycle of this form:
The payoff
Now we claim that, given the strategies described above, Matt has no m 3 -recall strategy that correctly "predicts" this pair of actions (i.e., plays the opposite action) more than 1 2 +ε of the time, for n large enough, and therefore Matt's payoff will be ≤ − Colin's strategy, as described above, is to choose, with uniform probability, any sequence x 1 , . . . , x L that satisfies (4.7), and play it periodically. To verify that the distribution of this sequence is arbitrarily close to an i.i.d. sequence, where the support of x i contains at least two elements. Then for
In our case, we may view L as a function of m 2 , and take α = 1 2 , so that we get Pr (∃s, t s.
and by (4.6a), this probability converges to 0. is the number of blocks, and this probability converges to 0, by (4.3) and (4.6b). Now, the sequence x 1 , . . . , x L played by both Rowena and Colin approximates an i.i.d. sequence. Combining this with the fact that f is chosen with uniform probability, we get that the distribution ofᾱ is arbitrarily close to that of a random , and Forest's sequence is independent of theirs). Therefore, for any strategy σ 3 of Matt, his expected payoff when playing σ 3 against this ideal sequence is close to his expected payoff when playing σ 3 here.
We have disregarded the beginnings of blocks, but as their frequency converges to 0 (since K → ∞), the following claim then suffices to prove ) t∈B is a sequence of bounded martingale differences; therefore Azuma's inequality (see, e.g., [1, p. 79]) implies that for every ε > 0, there exists C(ε) > 0, s.t.
Hence, for any finite set Θ of strategies τ as above,
At the beginning of the game, Matt chooses a pure m 3 -recall strategy σ 3 . The subgame strategy following a history h, σ 3 | h, depends on h only via Matt's memory α(= α(h)), i.e., the last m 3 stages within h. Hence, we denote σ 3 | h by τ (σ 3 , α).
In particular, when reaching the beginning of the cycle B, Matt's subgame strategy, τ (σ 3 , α), is completely determined by the memory α he may have at this point. Let Θ = Θ(σ 3 ) be the set of all possible strategies thus determined before B. Then,
There are no more than |A| m 3 possible memories; hence |Θ| ≤ |A| m 3 . Therefore, by (4.5), |Θ| · e −C(ε)·L → 0, and the result follows.
An alternative way of looking at the proof is as follows. Matt may choose σ 3 so that along the play it "encodes," through his own actions, information about the realization of σ −3 . His information also includes the past m 3 actions of his adversaries. However, all this information is limited, due to his bounded recall. Thus, even in the best imaginable case for him, in which σ 3 arrives at B with optimal memory, and σ 3 also makes optimal use of that memory along B, it will still do "well" only against a minor fraction of the realizations of σ −3 .
Proof of Theorem 2.1
In Section 4 we have proved one specific example, based on the three-player matching pennies stage game. Now we show how the result, that the payoff of the third player in the infinitely repeated game is not more than his minmax in correlated actions, extends to a general class of four-player games (when the appropriate relations between strength levels obtain) in which
First, let us point out that in Section 4, the set of actions available to Forest was taken to be A 4 = {0, 1, x} just for convenience. The extra action, Since p K, the effect on the average payoff is negligible; i.e., it approaches 0 as n → ∞.
There is, however, a further sacrifice: ifξ is to designate the beginnings of blocks correctly, Forest must avoid playing this sequence at any other time.
Recall that Forest's original strategy consisted of trying at every K-slot all possible {0, 1} K blocks consecutively, until hitting upon the right one. In Forest's modified strategy, he will not try any block that containsξ. If, in addition, no prefix ofξ equals a suffix ofξ (for example, chooseξ, so that the first half of it is 1, . . . , 1, and the second half, 0, . . . , 0), then Forest will playξ only between the blocks.
What is the second sacrifice's effect on the payoff? As we saw in Section 4.2, the sequence played by Forest is distributed almost like a random (i.i.d., uniformly distributed) sequence. Since the probability that a random Kblock containsξ is less than K · 2 −p , we again get, by the choice of p, that the effect on the payoff is negligible.
To prove the result, we begin by assuming that the payoff of Matt (player 3) is independent of Forest's actions, and prove the "moreover" part of the Colin can switch roles: Rowena will play a long random cycle, and Colin will choose his "instruction dictionary," and be instructed by Forest on how to match Rowena's actions.
The strategies follow an outline similar to the scheme in Section 4.1, but for this general stage game we need to make some adjustments. Let y ∈ ∆(A 1 × A 2 ) be a correlated distribution that achieves the minmax in correlated actions (when Forest plays according to z), i.e.,ȳ ∈ arg min y∈∆(A 1 ×A 2 )
[max x∈A 3 r 3 (y, x, z)]. Letȳ 2 denote the marginal distribution on A 2 , induced byȳ. For x ∈ A 2 , let (ȳ 1 |x) denote the conditional probability distribution on A 1 , induced byȳ, given that the outcome in A 2 is x.
Rowena chooses a random 1-1 function
K to use as her instruction dictionary, and plays according to Forest's play and f , as in Forest randomly chooses a function g :
, where g i (x) is distributed according to (ȳ 1 |x i ), independently for everyx ∈ (A 2 ) K and for every i. His goal is to instruct Rowena to play the block g(x) whenever Colin plays a blockx. As in Section 4.1, Forest tries the blocks consecutively, until he hits upon the right one. Here, the "right block" means the one that made Rowena play g 1 (x), . . . , g K (x), when Colin playedx = x 1 , . . . , x K (here Forest's strategy is not pure but mixed according to his random choice of g). Therefore, the play of Rowena and 
Proof of Theorem 2.2
Let D −k be a distribution on A −k with marginals D j on A j and assume that
, and by player j playing repeatedly the action a j we reduce the problem to one of a game with a set of players N \ {j}.
Let J = {1, . . . , k − 1} and
The result in this special case appears implicitly in the proof of [17, Theorem 2]; see also [19, Proposition 6] .
Assume that J + is nonempty. The strategies of players N \ {k} (or sim- 11 Actually, we could have replaced z in the theorem by any distribution ζ, provided that H(ζ) ≥ log 2 |A 1 |, where H signifies the entropy.
ply −k) will be designed so that their play (a The action choices of the strategy of a player j = k will not rely on the past actions of player k, and those of a strategy of a player j < k will depend only on the past actions of the players in J + .
We choose a sequence ε = (ε(n)) large n, more than εm/2 elements. Stages s ∈ S + of a block will be used by player k + 1 for additional signaling. As |A k+1 | ≥ 2, we deduce that for sufficiently large n, |A
Let Q be a distribution on A −k such that for every a ∈ A −k , mQ(a) is an integer and
For a positive integer m and a probability distribution q on a finite set B, T m (q) denotes all the m-length sequences b ∈ B m with empirical distribution q. In the sequel we use the following estimate (see, for instance, [7 
Let Y j be the set of all elements x ∈ A L j such that x * ∈ T m (Q j ) and let
The size of Y j . As T m (Q j ) is nonempty, (6.2) implies that
The size of Y J . Similarly,
We impose additional properties on the play of player k + 1. These additional properties allow player k + 1 to signal the end of a block and its index.
Recall that H(D k+1 ) > 0 and therefore |A k+1 | ≥ 2. Let a and b be two distinct actions in A k+1 . Let {ī : 1 ≤ i ≤ d} be a set of d distinct elements of {a, b}
that is an integer multiple of [εm/2] (see Figure 2 ).
Note that for sufficiently large m, the string ( − → a , b) appears in a sequence
x ∈ X i (k + 1) only once (at the end).
The size of X i (k + 1). Recall that |A k+1 | ≥ 2 and that for m sufficiently large, |S + | ≥ εm/2. Therefore, for m sufficiently large,
The sets X i (k + 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ d, are disjoint and we set X(k + 1) =
. . , d} be the surjective map defined by γ(x) = i ≥ 1 if x k+1 ∈ X i (k + 1), and γ(x) = 0 otherwise.
Let C ⊂ N \ {k} be a set of players with k + 1 ∈ C. A play (z 1 , . . . , z d )
of the set C of players, where z i ∈ A L C , is said to be C-correct, if, for every 1 < i ≤ d, the empirical distribution of z * i equals Q C , and for every 1
The strategy profile σ −k = (σ j ) j =k aims at generating a distribution over plays, such that with probability close to 1, it eventually repeats a correct play, and such that all correct plays are equally likely in the eventually repeated superblock play.
This aim is achieved by the description below of the strategy profile σ J + = (σ j ) j∈J + of the set of players J + and of the strategy σ j of each player j < k.
The strategy profile σ J + = (σ j ) j∈J + tries, in a random order, all the J + -correct plays in a superblock, until it observes that the play in a superblock is correct. Thereafter, it repeats its play in the correct superblock at each of the following superblocks.
A (k + 1)-correct play marks the end of each block so that the recall of each player j < k enables him to recall the play x of the last completed block play. The strategy of player j < k selects for each 0
is equally likely, and following a play x of players −k in a block, it plays f j γ(x) (x) in the following block (see Figure 3) . Let
For completeness of the definition of the strategy, we also have to define its play in the first block, as well as its play when it does not recognize the last completed block. The strategy of player j < k plays in the first block a random play in A L j , all equally likely. In all other cases it plays a fixed action.
The random order of "trials" of σ J + and the uniform randomness of the dictionaries f i j imply that the distribution defined by the strategy profile σ −k on plays of the repeated game is such that (conditional to the infinite play We now describe the random trials in the case that J + {k + 1}. Set
. Let w be the smallest integer w that is an integer multiple of d and such that |X 0 (k + 1)| w is larger than the number of J + -correct plays. Note that w = O(d) as n → ∞, and therefore each one of the players j > k recalls the play of the last wL + dL stages. Let the set J + of players agree on a dictionary that maps X 0 (k + 1) w onto the set of J + -correct plays. Player k + 1 selects a random order of all J + -correct plays, and in wL consecutive stages (namely, w blocks) player k + 1 plays an element of X 0 (k +1) w to signal via the agreed-upon dictionary the J + -correct play of the next trial.
We turn now to the proof that with probability close to 1 there is a play
, where
such that γ(x k+1 ) = 1, and for 1 < i ≤ d and y ∈ Y , X i is the set of all
such that x k+1 ∈ X i (k + 1), and X i (y) is the set of all x ∈ X i such that (x * , y * ) ∈ T m (Q).
Size of X i (y).
) ≥ ε/3 for sufficiently large m.
We use the following auxiliary concept. An element
By inequalities (6.3) and (6.4), |Y |/|Z| = 2
as m → ∞. Therefore, for sufficiently large m, using inequality (6.6), the conditional probability, given that (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ) is f -correct, that there is no
≤ e −2 εm/3 ≤ 2 −εm for m sufficiently large.
Therefore, the probability that there is no (
Recall that d, m, and ε are functions of n, with
Fix a sufficiently large T n such that for all sufficiently large n and any T ≥ T n that is an integer multiple of dL,
Note that if the play (a
1. As
+ 6ε 1 for n sufficiently large. Therefore, for n sufficiently large,
+ 6ε) < ε 1 and therefore
By the concavity and continuity of the entropy (as a function of the distribution), (6.7) implies that lim sup
The number of correct plays is ≥ 2 dmH(Q) /(m + 1) d|A −k | , and all correct plays are equally likely. Therefore H(a
. Using the continuity of the entropy function, H(Q) → n→∞ H(D −k ), and therefore, as
Let σ k be a pure strategy of the opponent. The number of strategies (σ k | h), where h ranges over all plays (z 1 , . . . , z T ) ∈ A T , is bounded by
Following [21] , for every q ∈ ∆(A −k ) and α > 0 we define v(q, α) as the maximum of E Q r k (a), where the maximum ranges over all distributions Q on A such that its marginal Q −k on A −k equals q and
Therefore, as (1)
1 dL
Proposition 2] that inequality (2.4) holds.
Equilibrium Payoffs
A classical "folk theorem" characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in the infinitely repeated game by means of the data of the stage game. Other "folk theorems" characterize the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium payoffs of game models that "approximate" the undiscounted infinitely repeated game model. Such approximations may involve variations on the duration (e.g., a long finitely repeated game), or discounted games with patient players, or repeated games with bounded rationality (e.g., repeated games with finite automata or with bounded recall), or any combination of such approximations. The present section focuses on the folk theorems for repeated games with bounded recall. Given a stage game G = (N, A, r), we denote by F = F (G) the convex hull of all points r(a), a ∈ A (then F is the set of feasible payoffs in the infinitely repeated (undiscounted) game), and
Theorem 7.1. Let G be a (k + 1)-player game, where (1) player k + 1 has sufficiently many stage actions, e.g., |A k+1 | ≥ |A S | for every S ⊂ {1, . . . , k} with |S| ≤ k −2, (2) r k+1 is constant, and (3) r i is independent of the actions of player k + 1, and there exists a vector payoff v ∈ F (G) such that for every
that satisfy assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3). Then,
If, in addition, log m k+1 m 1 , then
The theorem follows from the following observations. First, for any player
. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, players S ∪ {k + 1} can conceal the distribution D S ⊗ z from player i.
, and the classical pattern of proving a folk theorem -a plan with punishments -yields (7.1). Second, the condition log m k+1 m 1 implies that each player i can conceal from the other players
together with (7.1), implies (7.2).
Interpreting player k + 1 in Theorem 7.1 as a mechanism designer, rather than a participant, yields a folk theorem for repeated games with bounded recall and a mechanism designer. In equation (7.2), the set of equilibrium payoffs of players 1, . . . , k converges to the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs in a classical k-player repeated game, without any rationality bounds (this is the "Correlated Folk Theorem").
When player k + 1 is a participant in the game, rather than a mechanism designer, Theorem 2.2 specifies a set of distributions that can be concealed from a player in the repeated game with bounded recall. As a corollary, this narrows the gap between the known upper and lower bounds for the equilibrium payoffs in these games.
When the lengths of the players' recalls satisfy assumption (A1), namely, 
where < k, respectively > k, is the set of all players i with i < k, respectively with i > k.
Remarks

Concealed distributions
A profile of mixed SBR (or finite automata) strategies σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) induces a probability distribution over periodic plays of the repeated game, thereby inducing the average limiting frequency of any action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A (the average "empirical" probability of a). Thus, σ induces
We now define a notion of strategic concealment that is independent of payoff. Let J ⊂ N be a group of players, let D J ∈ ∆(A J ) be a given distribution over their actions, let player i / ∈ J be the opponent, and let C i be a class of strategies of i. We would say that the strategy tuple σ −i of players N \ i conceals the distribution (over the actions of the members of J) D J against C i , if the following holds: for every σ i ∈ C i and every action a i ∈ A i whose average empirical distribution is nonnegligible, the average empirical conditional distribution over A J , given that i plays a i , is close to D J .
This notion may be formally and succinctly defined using informationtheoretic terminology as follows. We use the notion of the Relative Entropy of a distribution p with respect to a distribution q, D(p q) (see, e.g., [7] ), to measure how much p differs from q. (This choice is quite immaterial for our purposes; other notions, e.g., the bounded variation norm, would serve just as well.)
First we define the notion of implementation. Fix a player i ∈ N and let J ⊂ N \ {i}.
Let x j be the projection from A onto A j , x = (x j ) j∈N , and for a subset 
is the conditional entropy of x J given the A i -valued random variable x i where
The conclusion of Theorem 2.2 can be stated using this (payoff independent) concept of concealment. Explicitly, under the assumptions of Theorem 2.2, there is a profile σ −k = (σ j ) j =k of m j (n)-recall strategies such that for every ε > 0, for n sufficiently large the strategy profile
Alternative bounded recall models
The 
Concealing correlation without a strong player
Here we give, in the exact bounded recall model, a simple example of a successful online concealed correlation by two players whose opponent is as strong as they are, with no other players in the game.
The stage game Gε, depicted in Figure 4 , is a slight modification of the three-player matching pennies game. For sufficiently small ε > 0, Matt's i.r.p. in the stage game is > − . We will see that Matt's i.r.p. in the repeated game where all three players use 1-EBR strategies is smaller than his i.r.p. in the stage game.
The mixed strategies of Rowena and Colin, σ 1 and σ 2 , are both the same: a mixture of two pure strategies, s I and s O , each with probability Play pure profile t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 . . . . . . , D x C (α) = 1 4 , and D x D (α) = Therefore, after seeing α, the probability of the play being A is ; thus (σ 1 , σ 2 ) indeed guaranteed that Matt's expected payoff in the 1-EBR infinitely repeated game will be no more than − 
Online concealed correlation by finite automata
Here we demonstrate that the same type of online concealed correlation achieved in our results, where the players were restricted to SBR strategies, is also achievable in another model in which the players are restricted 13 σ 1 and σ 2 are not contingent on Matt's play; and since Matt's EBR strategy cannot rely on his own actions either, the action he will take at this given stage has no effect on future play.
to strategies induced by finite automata, when analogous relations hold between the strength levels of the players. The adaptation to finite automata is done in a straightforward manner, using the same setup of strategies that was used for the SBR model. It seems conceivable that, for the finite automata model, the same result could perhaps be achieved under weaker assumptions, by some modification of these strategies.
A finite automaton for player i (in a repetition of a game G = (N, A, r))
is a tuple A = S, q 1 , f, g , where S is a finite state space, q 1 ∈ S is the initial state, f : S → A i is the action function prescribing an action to play at any given state, and g : S × A −i → S is the transition function.
Such an automaton A defines a strategy in the repeated game as follows.
At any stage, the action taken by A is determined by the current state of A, according to the action function f , while the current state along the stages is determined by the transition function g. Thus, let z t denote the state of In deriving this inequality for the maximization over τ ∈ BR k (m k ), the only property of such a strategy τ that was used is that the number of distinct strategies it defines on subgames is bounded by |A| m k , a property that holds also for any τ ∈ Σ k (s k ).
A time-dependent automaton is a machine whose action choices may depend both on t and on the current state. The main results remain intact also when allowing player k to maximize over all his time-dependent automata with s k states. Moreover, we can allow the maximizer to maximize over all time-dependent automata with mixed actions and mixed transitions.
Other comments
1. In [17] it is stated implicitly (see [17, Theorem 1] ) that in the model of repeated games with bounded recall, if the recall of player k is larger than that of each player j in a subset J of players, then the marginal on A J of a distribution D −k on A −k that can be concealed from player k is a product distribution. However, our example in Section 4 (or the general result) disproves Theorem 1 in [17] , due to the possibility of concealed correlation.
2. We have discussed only infinitely repeated games where the payoff is the limiting average payoff. Note, however, that in the main result the play of the concealing group enters a cycle at some point, and the time it takes to enter that cycle does not depend upon the payoff function. The limiting average payoff equals the average along that cycle, and the discounted payoff converges to this average as the discount factor approaches 1. Therefore, our results apply also to games with discounted payoffs, provided the discount
